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FOREWORD: WAR TALES AND WAR TRIALS
Patricia M. Wald*
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, after more than twenty years as a federal judge, I became a trial
judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Up to
that time, my knowledge of war had been derived from the dozens of books
and movies I had read and watched as I lived through World War II, the
Korean War, Vietnam, and the two Gulf Wars. Every day for the next two
years, I listened to the heart-wrenching stories of Balkan survivors of geno-
cide, massacres, prison camps, and planned executions. I remember
particularly one compelling woman who testified that in a single fateful
week she had lost a husband, son, father, brother, and twenty-six male rela-
tives in the genocide at Srebrenica. She announced to the court: "We wish
him [the defendant general] a death penalty, for him to disappear from the
face of the earth."' An Egyptian judge serving alongside me described the
evidence in that case as
scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands of men executed and buried in
mass graves, hundreds of men buried alive, men and women mutilated and
slaughtered, children killed before their mothers' eyes, a grandfather
forced to eat the liver of his own grandson. These are truly scenes from
hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.
In this foreword, I will compare my experiences as a judge on the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the work of war
crimes tribunals generally, with a few of the recurrent themes in epic tales of
war. Books and trials strive to educate and to persuade their audiences of the
barbarity of war and its antipathy to the most fundamental norms of a hu-
mane society.3 War crimes tribunals began with Nuremberg and have
proliferated in the past fifteen years. These tribunals were established to try
and to punish individuals for violations of international humanitarian
law ("IHL")-the so-called "law of war," itself only a century old, which
sets out "rules of engagement" for belligerent states and internal warring
groups.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Ret.);
Judge, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1999-2001).
I. Bosnian Serb accused of genocide, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2000, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/676297.stm (last visited Dec. 12, 2007).
2. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., Radovan Karadzic and
Ratko Mladic Accused of Genocide Following the Take-Over of Srebrenica (Nov. 16, 1995), http://
www.un.org/icty/pressreallp026-e.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2007).
3. Pierre Hazan, Measuring the Impact of Punishment and Forgiveness: A Framework for
Evaluating Transitional Justice, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 19, 32 (2006).
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1. WAR NOVELS
But do war crimes tribunals in any meaningful way address the profound
message of cynicism and rage at the futility, brutality, and arbitrariness of
war that permeates most enduring novels of the genre?
There is no question but that the war writers are the pessimists in the
equation: they see little merit in trying to salvage justice, honor, closure, or
reconciliation from mindless conflict. The tribunalists, however, while shar-
ing the writers' views on the inevitability of war, move cautiously and
haltingly to alleviate some of its most abhorrent practices in the persistent
hope that the introduction of a semblance of rules and order can help allevi-
ate the futility and fury that scorch the novelists' prose.
For example, Joseph Heller's soldier protagonist, Yossarian, a combat
bomber during World War II, thought it a "vile and muddy war .... Just
about all he could find in its favor was that it paid well and liberated chil-
dren from the pernicious influence of their parents. 4 Heller's characters
express their rage at the random carnage of a war which seemed to draw no
distinction between enemy and friend, guilty and innocent. After being or-
dered to bomb a road full of friendly villagers, the soldiers plead:
"Can't we even tip them off so they'll get out of the way?"
"They won't even take shelter .... They'll pour out into the streets to
wave when they see our planes coming, all the children and dogs and old
people. Jesus Christ! Why can't we leave them alone?"
"I don't know," Major Danby answered unhappily. "I don't know. Look,
fellows, we've got to have some confidence in the people above us who is-
sue our orders. They know what they're doing."
"The hell they do," said Dunbar.5
Articulating a similar cynicism, Vonnegut described his own experiences
with wartime justice during the Allied fire bombing of Dresden: "The irony
is so great. A whole city gets burned down, and thousands and thousands of
people are killed. And then this one American foot soldier is arrested in the
ruins for taking a teapot. And he's given a regular trial, and then he's shot by
a firing squad. 6
Running through all of the classics is anger at the brutality and futility of
war and at war's disproportionate toll on the soldiers and civilians at the
bottom of the heap. Hemingway's Farewell to Arms is typical:
I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and
the expression in vain. We had heard them, sometimes standing in the rain
almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted words came through, and
4. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 69 (1955).
5. Id. at 319-20.
6. KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE 4 (1969).
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had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over
other proclamations, now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred,
and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like
the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury
it.... Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were ob-
scene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the
names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.7
The sentiment is not peculiarly American. The French writer Sebastien
Japrisot laments in A Very Long Engagement:
I can wait. I'll keep waiting, for as long as it takes, for this war to be seen
in everyone's eyes for what it always was, the most filthy, savage, useless
obscenity that ever there was. I'll wait until the flags stop flying in No-
vember in front of the monuments to the dead, I'll wait until the Poor
Bastards at the Front stop gathering, wearing their damned berets and
missing an arm or a leg, to celebrate what?'
And Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andri6, in The Bridge on the River Drina,
chronicles centuries of Balkan wars against the backdrop of a solitary bridge
in one small town, and identifies the terrible undoing of human intercourse
that civil war typically brings:
[T]hen began the real persecution of the Serbs and all those connected with
them. The people were divided into the persecuted and those who perse-
cuted them. That wild beast, which lives in man and does not dare to show
itself until the barriers of law and custom have been removed, was now set
free.... As has so often happened in the history of man, permission was
tacitly granted for acts of violence and plunder, even for murder, if they
were carried out in the name of higher interests, according to established
rules, and against a limited number of men of a particular type and belief.9
The mood in these novels is fatalistic about the inevitability of war and
its profound yet haphazard insults to the human condition. "So it goes,"' °
Vonnegut famously punctuated death in war. In contrast, the purpose of the
war crimes tribunals and IHL has been to inject into the real-life killing
fields some elements of restraint, some limits on whom, how, and where the
human assaults can take place. Is that a fool's errand, a cynical fagade to
give cover to the true immorality of war?
I don't think so. War is not waged by born criminals but by ambitious
and ruthless leaders and by ordinary men and women executing their orders,
or themselves caught up in the emotional rush of nationalistic or factional
dogma. The injection of a realistic threat of personal punishment for known
violations of a code of wartime behavior does have potential for curbing
7. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, A FAREWELL TO ARMS 191 (1929).
8. StBASTIEN JAPRISOT, A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT 308 (1991).
9. Ivo ANDRI6, THE BRIDGE ON THE DRINA 282-83 (Lovett F Edwards trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press ed. 1977) (1945).
10. VONNEGUT, supra note 6, at 268.
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atrocities. The tribunals are still young and that potential has not been fully
realized, but for us to abandon the cause so early makes little sense to me.
II. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS: A HISTORY
War does, as novelists like Andri6 recount, too often rip the thin veneer
off civilization and convert ordinary, law-abiding people into rampaging
killers." Some legal commentators have suggested that for that reason,
crimes committed in the vortex of war should not be tried and punished like
ordinary crimes at all. In war, they say, an entire nation may turn criminal:
How can anyone start to assign a specific amount of responsibility to each
one of the hundreds of thousands-probably millions-of people who took
part in [the Rwandan massacres] ... ? How, in short, can one apply con-
ventional methods of legal judgment to the giant mass of the Hutu people
who were caught up in a profoundly abnormal reality? ... Millions of men
and women [lose], for some period of time, all recognition of the humanity
of their victims, and even of their own self-respect and humanity.2
This fatalism, however, has not sufficed for a majority of international
law experts or humanitarians. Hannah Arendt sums up their determination to
put boundaries on human predation even in time of war: "[I]t seems to
me... we have no tools to hand except legal ones with which we have to
judge and pass sentence on something that cannot even be adequately repre-
sented either in legal terms or in political terms."'
' 3
My own impression while serving as a judge at the Yugoslav Tribunal
was that the most serious war crimes committed by the middle- and upper-
level defendants were done with aforethought and for strategic reasons, not
in the heat of battle. The same is true for the terrible outrages perpetrated by
prison camp personnel on prisoners. In one of the camp trials detainees tes-
tified that they had to pass through a gauntlet of guards who beat them on
their way into and out of the eating area:
The bread would fly out of their hands. They had very little time to come
in, get their food, eat it, and go out, and all this would be accompanied by
blows. Everyone tried to hold on to his eighth of a loaf of bread....
[W]hen the blows fell, they would open their hands and the bread would
fall out of their hands. 
4
This kind of callous cruelty far from the battlefield cannot or should not in
my view be readily discounted by group hysteria.
11. ANDR16, supra note 9, at 233.
12. Helena Cobban, The Legacies of Collective Violence, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 2002,
available at http://bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2007); see also David
Ignatius, Casualties of War, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2007, at BW03 (reviewing DENIS JOHNSON,
TREE OF SMOKE (2007), and describing "damaged" American soldiers in Iraq who were "addicted to
war, feeding on it in a frenzy, being made crazy by it").
13. Cobban, supra note 12.
14. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 54 (Nov. 2, 2001).
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But, as the war novelists illuminate, war crimes can range from the trivi-
ality of Vonnegut's pillaged teapot to the cluster bombing of 139,000
Dresden residents, the cold-blooded execution of 8,000 young men from
Srebrenica in a single week in 1995, and the genocidal murders of nearly
one million Tutsis in 1994.
In fact, the earliest attempts at a code of behavior for combatants were
more adept at dealing with the kind of teapot pillaging and one-on-one as-
saults than with the most notorious and blameworthy war crimes such as
massacres, deportation, and other crimes against humanity perpetrated by
those who may never set foot on the battlefield, who in their far-off head-
quarters order, plan, incite, or instigate widespread campaigns of murder,
rape, and torture. 15
There were no codified laws of war well into the nineteenth century, and
they first appeared primarily in army manuals, enforced by military disci-
pline. In the twentieth century, multinational conventions were negotiated
dealing with the behavior of warring nations and proscribing certain prac-
tices-bombing hospitals, using poisonous weapons-as outside the
boundaries of civilized norms. In brief, only "military objectives" should be
attacked, and then only by means that permit targeting rather than "indis-
criminate" raids; and there should be a "proportionality" principle that
collateral damage to innocent civilians must not be disproportionate to the
value of the military objective. The Conventions-particularly the Geneva
Conventions-also laid down rules for the humane treatment of noncombat-
ants, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied territories.
6
None of the early Conventions dealing with the laws of war, however,
contained provisions for holding individuals liable for their violation. They
contemplated diplomatic negotiations, peace treaties, and possibly state-to-
state compensation as remedies. It was assumed that heads of state were
immune from liability for official acts, and it was accepted that prosecutions
15. See, e.g., DALAI LAMA, ETHICS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 204 (1999). He notes that
in modem warfare the role of those who instigate it are [sic] often far removed from the con-
flict on the ground.... Those who suffer most in today's armed conflicts are the innocent-
not only the families of those fighting but, in far greater numbers, civilians who often do not
even play a direct role. .... [M]ore and more, women, children, and the elderly are among its
prime victims.
Id.
16. For discussion of these principles, see Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of
War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551 (2006), reprinted in AMERICAN
SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, A CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215; GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 267-76 (2005); and A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD I-
46 (1996). The Rome Statute of 1998, codifying the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,
contains over thirty prohibited actions which constitute war crimes including willful killing, torture,
abuse of prisoners of war, hostage taking, unlawful confinement, intentional attacks on the civilian
population, interfering with humanitarian assistance, bombarding undefended towns, improperly
using a flag of truce or a UN emblem, forcing enemy nationals to participate in a war against their
native country, rape, sexual slavery, intentional starving of civilians, and conscripting of child sol-




by states of their own malefactors would be rare to nonexistent. 7 After
World War I the World Court, a predecessor to the current International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), provided an international forum for one state to
obtain a declaration or civil judgment against another for violation of inter-
national law, as well as a mediation and arbitration process. The operations
of the ICJ to this day, like those of the World Court before it, proceed at a
glacial pace,' 8 and its judgments are limited to the state parties involved who
must consent to the Court's jurisdiction in the first instance.' 9 As a practical
matter, its judgments are unenforceable except by international peer pres-
sure.
After World War I, the Paris Peace Conference compiled a list of thirty-
two war crimes and recommended individual trials for offenders, including
the Kaiser, before an international court. The United States, however, opted
out and the other Allies cooled for fear the renewed focus on German atroci-
ties would weaken the failing Weimar Republic and encourage a Bolshevik
revolution. An original list of near 20,000 suspected war criminals prepared
by the Allies was ultimately pared down to 13 who were tried before a
Reich Supreme Court in Leipzig; 6 were convicted.20 "[T]he Allies' experi-
ment in retributive justice following the First World War" was declared "a
dismal failure.
' 2'
By the middle of World War II, plans were afoot to set up an interna-
tional military tribunal to try Nazi and Japanese leaders for war crimes
based on the Hague and Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the League of
Nations Covenant, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.22 At war's end,
nonetheless, Churchill privately advocated for major Nazi war criminals to
be hauled before execution squads and shot, but U.S. leaders like President
Harry Truman, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and former Attorney Gen-
eral and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson pressed for public trials to
educate not only the German people but the world about what had happened
under the Nazis so that "never again" would it be repeated. For this purpose,
17. Meron, supra note 16, at 218.
18. Just last year, in 2007, the ICJ rendered a limited judgment against Serbia for failing to
prevent the genocide at Srebrenica as part of a broader genocide accusation initiated in 1993 by
Bosnia. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Feb. 26,
2007), http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=-1897&pt=l&pl=6&p2=1 (last visited Dec.
12, 2007).
19. See Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 COMP. POL.
STUD. 22, 25 (2006). The ICJ also gives nonbinding advisory opinions on legal questions submitted
by authorized international organs and agencies. Id. at 26.
20. WERLE, supra note 16, l 6-14.
21. Meron, supra note 16, at 223 (quoting M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: "The War to
End All Wars" and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 244, 290 (2002)).
22. Id. The Kellogg-Briand Pact condemned "war as an instrument of national policy" and
emphasized states' duties to resort to war only as a last resort for self-defense or when backed by
collective approval from the international community. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War
as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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the Allies agreed that twenty-four top leaders of the Hitler regime would be
tried in one nine-month trial before an International Military Tribunal
("IMT") in Nuremberg for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
(Twenty-two were tried; twelve were hanged; seven went to prison; and
three were acquitted.) This main trial was followed by the trials of 177 sec-
ond-tier leaders-in German industry, the medical profession, and the
judiciary-for their complicity in the Nazi outrages. 23 Across the world in
Japan, twenty-five top Japanese leaders and military officers were tried be-
fore another international tribunal set up by General MacArthur which
received less publicity, and, justifiably, less plaudits than the IMT in
24Nuremberg.
Nuremberg set the basic pattern for war crimes trials-the kinds of
crimes that would be prosecuted and the presumption that even alleged war
criminals have due process rights. Over the next half century, the list of
crimes grew incrementally, and the procedural rights were greatly enhanced,
with advances in human rights laws and the rule of law. Yet post-Nuremberg
there were no new international war crimes tribunals until the early nineties
when the ethnic wars that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia produced
the most extensive and horrifying accounts of executions, widespread rapes,
and concentration-like camps to emerge since World War II. The United Na-
tions Security Council in 1993, drawing on the precedent of Nuremberg, set
up a tribunal at the Hague in the Netherlands that would select judges from
the ranks of all UN members. Its mandate was to prosecute and try war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and the newly identified crime of genocide
committed during the Balkan conflict.5 The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") was slow to get up to speed; suspects
were indicted, but predictably, for several years few surrendered voluntarily
or were turned over by the warring factions or their state sponsors. The pace
quickened somewhat after the Dayton Accords of 1995 provided authority
for NATO peacekeepers to arrest indictees, but until the latter part of the
26decade business at the international court continued to lag.
In 1994, the United Nations set up a parallel tribunal, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), in Arusha, Tanzania, to prosecute
and try genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed dur-
ing the apocalyptic assaults by the Hutus upon the Tutsis and moderate
23. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 23, 33, chap. 22 (1992);
WERLE, supra note 16, 1 22-24; Meron, supra note 16, at 226.
24. WERLE, supra note 16, M 30-33; Meron, supra note 16, at 226, 235.
25. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).




Hutus in one year. -7 A reported more than 800,000 Rwandans were killed
21and an estimated 500,000 Rwandans took part in their killing.
A succession of war crimes courts have followed in the fifteen years
since (some national, some international): a Special Court for Sierra Leone
following the brutal civil war in that impoverished country; 29 a UN-backed
Special Panel in East Timor to try the perpetrators of the massacres that fol-
lowed the referendum on separation from Indonesia in 2000;30 and a belated
hybrid court (part national, part international) to try the Khmer Rouge lead-
ers in the 1975-79 cataclysmic convulsion that killed 1.6 million
Cambodians.3' Iraq chose to try its leaders in national courts; Bosnia and
even Serbia have followed suit in the wake of imminent shutdowns of the
ICTY national courts; and there have been a few, largely abortive, tries at
invoking universal jurisdiction by one country to try the war criminals of
another country.
32
The prime development of the new century has been the establishment
of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") in 2002 over strong U.S. oppo-
sition. It was joined by more than 100 other nations and currently is
investigating or trying referrals involving "situations" in four African coun-
tries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic,
and the Darfur region of Northern Sudan, the last by referral from the Secu-
rity Council without a U.S. veto.33 It has issued ten warrants of arrest and is
proceeding with the trials of three defendants in custody.34 The ICC's care-
27. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
28. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 15
(1999).
29. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on Estab-
lishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing Special Court for Sierra Leone].
30. U.N. Transitional Admin. in E. Timor Regulation 2000/15: On the Establishment of
Panels With Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Serious Criminal Offences, 22-1, U.N.T.A.E.T. Doc. No.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/
RegOO15E.pdf.
31. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments
as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NSIRKM/1004/006), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
law/4/KRLaw as amended_27_Oct_2004 Eng.pdf.
32. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Dec.
10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231 (2004). For an evaluation of the successes and failures of these later tribu-
nals, see UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (S. Macedo ed., 2004): WFRLE, supra note 16, In1 171-76; Meron,
supra note 16, at 563; and Symposium, hiternational Criminal Tribunals in the 21st Century, 21
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 487 (2006).
33. Rome Statute, supra note 16; S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005)
(Darfur referral); Int'l Criminal Court, Situations and cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last
visited Dec. 12, 2007).
34. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SUPPORT PRO-
JECT 2008, at 3 (on file with author); Three New ICC Judges Sworn in, Hirondelle News Agency,
Jan. 17, 2008; Press Release, International Criminal Court, Third detainee for the International
Criminal Court: Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/329.html; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal
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Foreword
fully defined list of seventy war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide is the most refined to date, benefiting by the jurisprudence of the earlier
war crimes courts. The Court's reach is global though limited by a require-
ment that a case or "situation" be referred by (1) a State party that has
ratified the Rome Statute or a consenting participant in the case, (2) the
Prosecutor, or (3) the Security Council. The case or situation under investi-
gation must also involve a state party or consenting state whose national is a
suspect or on whose territory the alleged crime has been committed.35 A fur-
ther complementarity limit exists if a state which would normally have
jurisdiction over the alleged case demonstrates to the prosecutor or the court
that it is able and willing to try or to investigate the case itself. The prosecu-
tor must then refrain, subject to periodic review, to allow the intervening
36state a chance to do So. The ICC, unlike earlier war crimes courts, is apermanent institution.
III. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS: AN ASSESSMENT ON THEIR OWN TERMS
We may ask: What did the war crimes tribunals aim to do? How well
have they done it? And is their activity directed at the same horrors of war
that the novels have highlighted?
The tribunals have, as we will see, extraordinarily ambitious goals and if
judged by their attainment often fall short. The mere articulation of the goals
may create expectations which cannot be met. The novelists by and large do
not invite any such hopefulness about deterrence, reconciliation, punishment
of wrongdoers, or a more just conduct of war. Like Vonnegut's Slaughter-
house Five or Japrisot's Long Engagement, they expect the wartime killers
to escape punishment or, more likely, to be rewarded and promoted.
War crimes tribunals aim to, among other things, end the "culture of im-
punity" for the perpetrators of wartime atrocities. This culture has for
centuries effectively eliminated risk of punishment when war ended.37 Until
the advent of tribunals, the higher up the war crimes perpetrators were in the
hierarchy of national power and the more expansive or extensive their
crimes were, the less likely it was that they would ever be punished. Am-
nesty, a key element of most peace processes, ensured their immunity. The
tribunals brought hope that the specter of a probing inquiry into the legality
of wartime actions and the possibility of heavy penalties for perpetrators
might be a deterrent to war crimes. Most international commentators agree
Court, Address to the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/asp/Statement-Prosecutor-en_30Nov2007.pdf.
35. Rome Statute, supra note 16, arts. 5-8, 11-14.
36. Id. art. 18; id. art. 16 (allowing the Security Council to defer an investigation or prosecu-
tion for twelve months). For a comprehensive survey of the ICC's jurisdiction and operations, see
LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (2002), and WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2001).
37. Hazan, supra note 3, at 39-40.
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the jury is still out on any substantial relationship between the threat of war
crimes prosecutions and deterrence of war crimes."
I tend to believe that over the longer haul, if the tribunals survive and
compile a strong record of prosecutions, they will have a deterrent effect.
The defendants I saw in the dock during my tenure at the ICTY seemed at
times perplexed, even incredulous, that what they had thought of as part of
the ambiance of war now had catapulted them into an international tribunal
and the risk of prison in a faraway country.
A second aim of these tribunals is to diffuse the outrage of war crimes
victims and their kin by personalizing the worst crimes of benighted indi-
viduals, not simply of groups, so as to avoid lasting enmities between the
warring factions. Again, we have no compelling data yet that the tribunals
have succeeded in this goal either. My own experience traveling through the
ruins of old wars and talking to survivors suggests strongly that group ten-
sions have a long shelf life, particularly in civil wars where members of the
groups must go back to living side by side. This is exemplified by post-war
Bosnia, where ethnic fissures continue to thwart creation of a multinational
police force for the Dayton Federation, where many schools are segregated
between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims,4° and where even a superhighway es-
sential to the country's economic future cannot surmount factional
dissension.4' Indeed, years after the fighting has ended, hostilities still run
high toward witnesses who testified against accused perpetrators in the tri-
bunals. Nearly one-half of all victim-witnesses before the ICTY demand and
get special protective measures to shield their identities.42 In the case of the
Rwandan domestic trials and even gacacas---community-based forums to
attempt conciliation or impose lesser prosecutions than the regular courts for
war-based crimes-brutal killings and harassment of witnesses and court
43
personnel have proliferated during the post-war years.
The war novels I have talked about do not focus mainly on the traumas
of the wars' aftermath. A few do-a lonely survivor in Louis de Bemi~res's
Birds Without Wings records the decades of Muslim-Turkish-Western cam-
paigns in the Mideast, concluding:
38. Id. at 34-35 (presenting some evidence of war crimes deterrence as a short-term personal
threat if tribunals are perceived as capable of prompt indictments and arrests).
39. Jonathan Finer, Fractured Bosnia Struggles to Form Police Force For All, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2007, at A14.
40. See Nicholas Wood, Mostar Journal; An Effort to Unify a Bosnian City Multiplies Fric-
tions, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 15, 2004, at A4.
41. Jonathan Finer, New Highway Bogs Down in Bitterly Divided Bosnia, WASH. POST, Sept.
1,2007, at A 1.
42. Patricia M. Wald, Dealing With Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugo-
slavia Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 223-24 (2002); see also Shankar Vedantam,
Wariness, Not Hatred, Keeps Civil Wars Raging, WASH. POST, May 7, 2007, at A3; Nicholas Wood,
Kosovo War-Crimes Trial Splits West and Prosecutors, N.Y. IMES INT'L, April 5, 2007, at A12
(noting that more than a third of prosecution witnesses in Kosovo leaders ICTY trials are allowed to
conceal their identities).




I blame potentates and pashas whose names I will probably never know,
and I blame men of God of both faiths, and I blame all those who gave
their soldiers permission to behave like wolves and told them that it was
necessary and noble.... In the long years of those wars here were too
many who learned how to make their hearts boil with hatred, how to betray
their neighbors, how to violate women, how to steal and dispossess, how to
call upon God when they did the Devil's work, how to enrage and embitter
themselves, and how to commit outrages even against children.... I tell
you now that even if guilt were a coat of sable, and the ground were deep
in snow, I would rather freeze than wear it."
The "closure" that tribunal supporters speak of may be as simple as kin-
folk learning where their loved ones are buried, and it may well be a source
of succor to survivors that individual perpetrators of atrocities are tried and
punished. But there is conflicting evidence as well that the individual prose-
cutions do not diffuse the enmity toward the group to which the individual
perpetrator belonged and that the victims seek some group chastisement as
well. The "bad egg" theory may not carry the day. This was demonstrated
recently when Bosnian survivors registered deep disappointment at the ICJ
verdict that Serbia was not itself guilty of genocide,45 and again in the bitter
debate over whether the U.S. Congress, a century later, should label the Ar-
menian massacre a genocide.46
A third aspiration of these courts is to record for history an accurate ac-
count of war crimes as a hedge against future disclaimers that they never
happened at all. Experts differ here, too, on the efficacy of the courts for this
objective, for example, whether judges and adversary proceedings are in-
deed the best way to ferret out historical truth (if such a thing can be
determined). But insofar as history is itself composed of a compilation and
distillation of many views of the same events, there can be little question
that the exquisitely detailed accounts of wartime atrocities, elicited in
month- and year-long trials, contribute mightily to the process. They may in
many cases tip the balance of historical judgment regarding factual contro-
versies.
Of course, good novelists thoroughly research their wars, and for the
popular reader they are a main source of history and perception.4' But a
court-originated account subjected to opposing experts and even cross-
examination will inevitably carry greater weight for future historians, read-
ers, and policymakers. Both novelists and jurists aim at the same end-in
Justice Jackson's words at Nuremberg-"to establish incredible events by
credible evidence." Even if establishing those events does not surely deter, it
44. LouIs DE BERNItRES, BIRDS WITHOUT WINGS 4-5 (2004).
45. Nicholas Wood, Bosnian Muslims View Ruling as Another Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2007, at A6.
46. Molly Moore, Turkey Requests Authority to Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2007, at Al 2.




provides the indispensable foundation for the legitimacy of sanctions, legal
and literary, for those criminally involved.
The fourth justification for tribunals-instilling accepted rules of law to
govern international and even internal conflicts-rates higher marks in prac-
tice. This is an area where tribunals by consensus have done their best work,
building a formidable body of precedents for IHL as to what constitutes spe-
48
cific war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Violators can no
longer claim that they did not know certain acts were outlawed or that they
thought they had a good defense in "just following orders. 49
The final aim of the tribunals-to do justice-ultimately stands or falls
on the same intuitive evaluation that we bring to our domestic criminal jus-
tice systems. Witnesses at the ICTY trials repeatedly cried out at the end of
their torturous recountings that "someone must pay." Justice is the ideal, but
retribution or even revenge is also a primordial instinct that cannot be alto-
gether discounted in defining what justice consists of. On the whole,
however, the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) have been seen as fair and
dispassionate in their judgments, 0 as has the Sierra Leone court. Other hy-
brids have either been denied the resources to do their job properly (East
Timor) or are still too young to evaluate (Cambodia).
IV. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS: AN ASSESSMENT
BASED ON THE NOVELISTS' GOALS
Do these goals of war crimes tribunals differ markedly from the wrench-
ing pleas of war novelists for far-reaching change-in short, an end to war
itself? Do the novelists implicitly disagree with tribunals' pragmatic choices
to go after the leading war criminals-the "big fish"-leaving the petty mis-
feasors free to roam in society alongside their former victims? The novel
gives voice to the victims' pain and outrage. But do the tribunals-hemmed
in by legal niceties-leave those same victims frustrated and not satisfied
that they have been truly listened to?
A. War as a Crime
In Slaughter House Five the wife of a war buddy erupts when the author
tells her he is writing a book about the war:
"You'll pretend you were men instead of babies, and you'll be played in
the movies by Frank Sinatra and John Wayne or some of those other glam-
orous, war-loving, dirty old men. And war will look just wonderful, so
48. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of the Most Significant Achievements of
the ICT' 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 903, 907-11 (2003).
49. Some theorize that international norms act as external constraints on countries and on
individuals and eventually become internalized. See Hazan, supra note 3, at 25.
50. This is not to say the ICTY and ICTR have not been criticized in some quarters for their
selection of defendants and exclusion of judges from certain countries. See id. at 30-34 (discussing




we'll have a lot more of them. And they'll be fought by babies like the ba-
bies upstairs.'
Nuremberg and Tokyo were the only tribunals to prosecute separately
the waging of war itself as a crime against peace or a crime of aggression.
Indeed the crime of aggressive war was Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson's
central focus at Nuremberg. Despite its inclusion within the Nuremberg
Principles adopted by the United Nations, later tribunals did not prosecute
aggression as a war crime. Although Nuremberg convicted twelve on that
count (Hess was the only Nuremberg defendant convicted solely of crimes
against peace), and Tokyo convicted fourteen, the notion of waging war as a
crime per se was controversial among the other Allies.52 Telford Taylor,
Jackson's successor at Nuremberg, later wrote he thought it unfair to convict
the German leaders solely on the basis of waging war. Before Nuremberg,
he said, few if any would have concluded waging even an aggressive war
was by itself an international crime for which individuals could be held li-
able; although the principle was fine, its application at Nuremberg was
questionable.
53
Fifty years later, the drafters of the Rome Statute included aggression as
a crime within ICC jurisdiction, but deferred exercise of such jurisdiction
until a Special Working Group could report back in 2009 on how to define
the crime and the conditions of its prosecution. The main points of conten-
tion include: whether labeling a conflict an act of aggression inevitably calls
for a political judgment on complex facts, so that no state leader should be
individually sanctioned by a court on the basis of initiating such an act,
unless the UN Security Council itself has made the assessment; and whether
the threshold for the crime should be a war or any aggressive act in manifest
violation of the charter.
5 4
Thus while many novelists long for a universal condemnation of all or at
least most wars on humanitarian grounds, most, like Vonnegut, realize sadly
they can't have it." Even under the most optimistic scenario, we will con-
tinue to have "good" and "bad," "just" and "unjust" wars in the international
56legal sphere for the indefinite future. Several of the novelists in fact con-cede the validity of some wars. Tolstoy in War and Peace considers it
51. VONNEGUT, supra note 6, at 13.
52. TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 635-36.
53. Id.
54. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5. For the ad hoc courts that rely mainly on customary
law as the basis for their legitimacy and authority to find individuals criminally responsible, the
status of aggression or crimes against peace as international violations susceptible to individual
prosecutions is still debatable. See Meron, supra note 16, at 229. But see SCHABAS, supra note 36, at
26-28, 66; WERLE, supra note 16, N 1151-1189; cf U.N. Charter arts. 2, para. 4; id. arts. 39, 51.
See generally Garth Schofield, The Empty U.S. Chair: United States Nonparticipation in the Nego-
tiations on the Definition ofAggression, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 20 (2007).
55. VONNEGUT, supra note 6, at 4 ("[Tlhere would always be wars ... they were as easy to
stop as glaciers.").
56. See, e.g., JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, MAKING WAR TO KEEP PEACE (2007) (noting appease-
ment may be a worse alternative to war in some cases).
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legitimate to defend the homeland, and even Hemingway in For Whom the
Bell Tolls admits through Robert Jordan that fighting Fascism is worth dying
for: "The first theory was to win the war. If we did not win the war every-
thing was lost." But, his old comrade adds ruefully, "All that I am sorry for
is the killing.... It must really be a great sin. 57 It is hard to believe the nov-
elists would disdain the search--elusive though it may be-for some
workable concept of when war is justifiable.
B. Big Fish and Little Fish
The powerlessness of ordinary men and women caught in the grip of
wars instigated and strategized by the generals and politicians is another
familiar theme of modem war novels like Catch-22 and Slaughterhouse
Five. But in some of these books, both military and civilian victims suffer
most directly and poignantly at the hands of middle- and low-level function-
aries: prison camp guards, interrogators, out-of-control troops, and petty
bureaucrats." Wartime abuses depicted in the tribunal trials are not so differ-
ent. Victim-witnesses testified at one ICTY trial as follows:
[W]hen I look back it seems to me that they [the guards] were absolutely
out of control, that nobody obeyed anyone.... Anybody could kill any-
body they liked at any time in any shift. It was sufficient for him to call
him out, and very often certain personal accounts could be settled in that
59
way ....
One of the chief dilemmas of the war crimes courts, however, has been
where to concentrate limited resources for the greatest deterrent or closure
effect. The principal Nuremberg trial featured twenty-two of the most
prominent leaders of the Nazi hierarchy-preeminently Herman Goering,
Rudolph Hess, Martin Bormann, Jules Streicher, and Admiral Karl Doenetz.
The ICTY and ICTR were mandated by charter to prosecute only "serious"
violations of international humanitarian law;60 the Rome Statute limits juris-
diction of the ICC to "the most serious crimes of international concern" and
permits the court to reject referrals as not of "sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court., 6' The Sierra Leone Tribunal was designed
originally to run for only three years and to prosecute only twenty or so
leaders who "bear the greatest responsibility"62 for the commission of seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law during that ten-year civil
war. Except for the early years of the ICTY, when no "big fish" had been
57. ERNEST HEMINGWAY. FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS 136, 197 (Charles Scribner's Sons
2003) (1940).
58. See, e.g., Louis BEGLEY, WARTIME LIES (1991).
59. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 411 (Nov. 2, 2001).
60. S.C. Res. 955, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 808, at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
61. Rome Statute, supra note 16, arts. 1, 17.
62. Agreement Establishing Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 29, at 138; David M.
Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 505, 508 (2005).
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apprehended, and the court indicted a series of middle- and lower-level vio-
lators to fill the void, the ad hoc tribunals have usually followed
Nuremberg's lead in sticking to the upper-tier defendants.63
The rationalization behind this top-down strategy is self-evident. If de-
terrence works at all, it is the top echelon that planned or knowingly
permitted the crimes against humanity involving "widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population" 64 or the genocides involv-
ing "intent to destroy ... a national, ethnical, religious or social group"
65
that need most to be deterred. It is their punishment the world will note.
Even their indictments have political ramifications: former Serbian
Autonomous Republican President Radovic Karadizic is now a politically
impotent fugitive, unable since being indicted to hold public office or even
to attend the Dayton Peace Accords; indicted and deposed Charles Taylor,
former President of Liberia, was flushed out of his Nigerian asylum and
turned over to the Sierra Leone tribunal; Slobodan Milosevic, who died dur-
ing the fourth year of his trial at the ICTY, was turned out of office after
indictment; the former prime minister of Rwanda is serving a life-long
prison sentence after pleading guilty to genocide. Some of these men might
have thought twice about their war actions had they believed that interna-
tional law was more than a phantom.
In my own experience at the ICTY, I sometimes found it strange to be
prosecuting middle- or lower-level defendants whose chief defense was that
they had only been following orders from an uncaptured or unindicted supe-
rior. This was true in the genocide trial of General Krstic, who served under
Serbian General Mladic. General Mladic was a true phantom in the dark:
there is little doubt about his leadership of the Srebrenica genocide based on
the evidence in his subordinate's trial, but he still remains free after fifteen
years.6 I do not question that the tribunal's first duty is to catch and try the
foremost leaders, civilian and military. It simplifies trials down the line and
eradicates the unease caused when courts bring the full force of interna-
tional law down on some defendants but fail to try their more blameworthy
superiors.
There are drawbacks to the "big fish" strategy. Too often it creates an
"immunity gap" for those below the cut-off-victims see their personal per-
secutors return untouched to their villages, to resume local positions of
power free of retribution. Even on those too-rare occasions when national
governments move in to fill the gap and to prosecute lower-echelon war
criminals, it does not always ease residual tensions or make reconciliation
any easier if they lack the resources to do an adequate job. The discrepancy
in treatment between international and national courts can exacerbate rather
63. Meron, supra note 16, at 224-28 (discussing the fact that the availability of high-profile
defendants often depends on cooperation of national governments; ICTR tried higher-level defen-
dants from the beginning due to cooperation from African governments).
64. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 7.
65. Id., art. 6.
66. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001).
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than relieve tensions by adding to the disgruntled groups. In Rwanda,
80,000-130,000 accused (the "little fish") languished for up to ten years in
local jails in deplorable conditions, some facing possible death penalties.
Meanwhile, the "big fish" enjoyed the full panoply of international due
process without fear of capital punishment and awaited trial in upscale
61
ICRC detention facilities meeting UN standards.
I personally encountered the depth and intensity of survivors' rage at
these lowly functionaries during one of the trials I judged. The defendants
were a Serb prison camp deputy commandant, a former small town police-
man, three former waiters and taxi drivers promoted to shift commander
guards, and an administrative aide at the camp who was a retired reserve
police officer. The camp commandant and those who established the camp
had not yet been apprehended or had died resisting arrest. Conditions at the
camp were unimaginably bad for the over 1000 prisoners: they were starved,
beaten, and deprived of rest or medial care; the women were sexually ex-
ploited. As one inmate among dozens testified, "When [the guards] were
feeling bored, they would just lash out at you for no reason at all., 68 Four
defendants were convicted but received prison terms of five to seven years
and most were released earlier than that, provoking outraged reactions from
victims and their advocates: "'What were they [the judges] thinking' when
they handed down these sentences for concentration camp shift commanders
that would free them in 9 months ... [i]s that what all this vast effort, skill,
dedication, and funding went to accomplish?
69
Some prosecutors and experts agree with the victims of the little fish:
"Talk of big fish and little fish implies that unless you are high on the scale
of authority you are not worth going after, and that's an insult to the person
whose family was blown away by a little fish. 7 °
Yet the reality of sparse resources available to the international courts
tilts heavily toward the "big fish" strategy. It is left to the stricken countries
themselves to take up the slack. A few, such as Bosnia and Croatia, have
only recently begun to do so.
The "big fish" strategy of war tribunals has another unintended conse-
quence: it tends to concentrate indictments and trials on the novel legal
theories that must underlie prosecutions of individuals who were remote
67. OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RWANDA JUSTICE SYSTEM AND II BIs TRANSFERS
PROJECT (2007) (on file with author); Le Mon, supra note 43, at 16 n.2.
68. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/I-T, Judgment, 143 (Nov. 2, 2001). For a full
account of the case, see Patricia McGowan Wald, The Omarska Trial-A War Crimes Tribunal
Close-Up, 57 SMU L. REV. 271 (2004).
69. Wald, supra note 68, at 285 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting posting of
Michael Sells, msells@haverford.edu, to just-watch-l@listserve.acsu.buffalo.edu (July 31, 2002) (on
file with author)).
70. Peter Ford, How to Prosecute a War Crime, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 13, 2000, at
6 (quoting Brenda Hollis, former ICTY prosecutor); see also Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of
the Most Significant Achievements of the ICTY, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 903, 906 (2002-2003) ("Be-
cause it is typically the lower level persons who physically commit the murders, rapes, and other
crimes, and the ones survivors tend to identify as their victimizers, it is important to get the physical
perpetrators in the dock.").
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from the scene of the crimes and did not themselves kill, rape, or plunder.
The lessons of Nuremberg have been well learned by those leaders. The
document-rich troves of Nuremberg have not been replicated in modern-day
trials; no current State leader is now likely to sign orders to execute POWs,
tyrannize civilians, subject prisoners to inhumane conditions, or ethnically
cleanse territories. Doctrines of command responsibility and common pur-
pose or criminal enterprise have had to be developed and expanded to take
individual criminal responsibility as high up the military and civilian hierar-
chy as possible in the absence of direct incriminating evidence as to their
involvement in the crimes on the ground.' As a consequence, many of the
trials are consumed by legal arguments on the scope and necessary proof of
these new legal doctrines. The viability of amnesties, the scope or continu-
ing validity of head of state immunity doctrines, the intricacies of command
responsibility, and the status of the obedience to orders (Nuremberg) de-
fense take front and center place in the proceedings. Some tribunal
proceedings have indeed come to resemble our RICO trials at home: who
knew what and when? Explication of these theories of liability are necessary
to the legitimacy of the trials as conducted under a rule of law. The devil is
in the details of precisely what happened at every stage of momentous
events; in the Krstic trial a controlling dispute arose over the exact moment
at which command was handed over from one general to another. It con-
sumed weeks of testimony but it was critical to the verdict.
Unlike war novels, however, it is not easy to make these trials a dramatic
or transformative experience. Local people interviewed often do not under-
stand why X was convicted and Y got off or even what their crimes
consisted of. By focusing on the immediate effects of discrete atrocities
committed against characters we have come to empathize with, war novels
probably better reflect and satisfy the enduring sense of outrage and per-
plexity that haunts victims and survivors than do the trials of major war
criminals.
One other aspect of the "big fish" strategy bears noting. There have been
many more prosecutions of high-level military and civilian leaders based on
Geneva Convention rules (for the humane treatment of civilians and prisoners)
than on Hague Convention offenses involving the conduct of the war (such as
strategic bombing or targeting of nonmilitary objectives or bombings with
disproportionate civilian casualties), despite the greater potential of the lat-
ter for mass civilian deaths and injuries. For example, to the consternation of
some, the ICTY prosecutor refused to open an investigation based on the
NATO bombing of Belgrade radio stations, electricity grids, and civilian
residences during the Kosovo conflict.7' The indiscriminate-type Dresden
bombing condemned in Slaughterhouse Five has not featured prominently
in war crimes tribunals for several reasons. Many of today's civil wars use
primitive weapons; the Rwanda genocide and Sierra Leone civil wars were
71. See HAZAN, supra note 26, at 127-28, 132-35.
72. William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable Legal Standards for
Combat Activities 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 114, 137 (2007).
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fought with machetes and rifles. But even in more technologically advanced
wars, an ICTY prosecutor has written that war crimes involving strategic
and tactical decisions on weapons and targets are "simply too difficult to
prosecute."73 Only a handful of "unlawful attack" cases have been brought at
the ICTY. One successfully challenged the reign of terror on Sarajevo civil-
ians through sniping and shelling of the marketplaces and other places of
public gathering; another successfully challenged the destruction of the Old
Town cultural centers in Dubrovnik. But in practice this area of strategic
military actions has turned out to be too "gray" for overworked prosecutors
to spend time and resources on.74 It is also politically the most hazardous,
implicating the highest level of technical and political judgments made at
the highest level of command. Ironically, it was the specter of foreign court
surveillance over this kind of tactical and strategic decision making that
Pentagon critics of the ICC found most threatening and that still motivates
in large part their opposition to U.S. ratification of the Rome Treaty. While
the tribunals may be limiting attention to the big fish, they have so far shied
away from the biggest ponds in which they swim.
C. The Role of the Victims
War novels depict the insignificance of the individual soldier or civil-
ian-a victim with little or no control over his or her fate. In the beginning,
war crimes trials similarly made no attempt to involve victims except as tra-
ditional witnesses-take the stand, tell your story, go back to your home.
Witnesses themselves, in my experience, often voiced frustration at their
inability to take a more active part in the trials or to tell their stories in their
own narrative style rather than respond to the ping-pong interrogations that
characterize the adversary mode of trials. This is compounded when they are
questioned in a language other than their own. They frequently complain, on
the stand and off, of the court's inability to compensate them for their suffer-
ings or the hardships of testifying.7 Recent war crimes courts-including
the ICC-have made provision for more active participation of victims in
76the proceedings as well as the possibility of compensating at least some.
But it is a tremendously complicated business to bring victims into the
criminal process. The Cambodian tribunal and the ICC are currently strug-
gling with the accommodations of such a process. Although the ICC victims
may be allowed to present their views "at stages of the proceedings deter-
73. Id. at 114.
74. See id.
75. All the tribunals have established victim-witness units to furnish advice and to provide
escort services and medical or psychological help to victim-witnesses, particularly women who
must testify on sexual abuse charges.
76. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 68 (permitting views of victims to be presented at
"appropriate stages" of proceeding); id. art. 75 (allowing court to order reparations to victims); id. at
art. 79 (creating trust fund for benefit of victims of crimes and their families).
[Vol. 106:901
mined to be appropriate by the Court, ' ' 77 several critical questions remain:
how to ensure meaningful victim representation while proceedings are not
unduly delayed or the defendants unduly prejudiced; how to select those
who will participate in situations where victims of a defendant number in
the thousands or even millions; and how to determine which stages are "ap-
propriate" for victim representation. In the ICC, a Trust Fund for Victims is
being established for voluntary contributions. But realistically it is difficult
to see how the number of active victim participants in the proceedings can
even begin to meet the hopes or diffuse the frustration of victims and their
advocates.
Women especially have played predominantly the role of innocent vic-
tim and idealized but doomed soul mate in war novels-Maria in For Whom
the Bell Tolls and Catherine Barkley in A Farewell to Arms.79 Sometimes an
atypical female participant braves the fray and sets out to rescue her lost
lover-Mathilde in A Very Long Engagement.s° Women and children, it is
now recognized, account for an overwhelming number of the victims of war
and war crimes. 8' And to their credit the tribunals have pioneered in bringing
war crimes against women to the forefront in prosecutions for rape, sexual
slavery, and other gender crimes that had historically been hidden under
obfuscatory umbrella names such as crimes against honor-or not
prosecuted at all. 82 There has also been a healthy, albeit belated, infusion of
women into key prosecutorial and judicial roles in the tribunals."
V. ARE THERE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS?
The question inevitably arises: if the war crimes tribunals cannot fully
accomplish their own goals or those established by war novels, are there
other effective mechanisms that will do better as to either set? Several coun-
tries have experimented with alternatives to war crimes courts. A brief
77. Id. art. 68.
78. HEMINGWAY, supra note 57.
79. HEMINGWAY, supra note 7.
80. JAPRISOT, supra note 8.
81. Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 213-15 (1999).
82. See Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 8 (including a comprehensive list of gender of-
fenses as war crimes); Askin, supra note 70, at 909-10; Meron, supra note 16, at 231 (describing a
change since the Nuremberg tribunal: at recent ad hoc tribunals, rape is prosecuted as a crime
against humanity, as torture, and as an instrument of genocide).
83. Two of the three prosecutors at the ICTY have been women. Article 36 of the Rome
Statute requires countries nominating candidates for judges (and prosecutors) to seek "fair represen-
tation" of men and women and to give special consideration to legal expertise in the field of
violence against women and children. Out of eighteen judges on the ICC, currently seven of them
are women (eight until a recent resignation). See generally Judith Resnik, Sisterhood, Slavery and
Sovereignty: Transnational Antislavery Work and Women's Rights Movements in the United States
During the Twentieth Century, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND TRANSATLANTIC ANTISLAVERY IN THE ERA
OF EMANCIPATION 19 (Kathryn Kish Sklar & James Brewer Stewart eds., 2007).
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survey of their success in meeting the challenges of novelists and tribunal
critics follows.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions ("TRCs") are the most frequent
substitute or complement to the tribunals. Some, but not all, provide am-
nesty to participants. TRCs generally encourage war criminals to make full
confessions and to accept communal penance in the form of restitution to
victims or community service. South Africa's is the best known; Bishop
Desmond Tutu has publicly commented that the apartheid leaders would not
have agreed to a peaceful transition to democratic rule if Nuremberg-type tri-
als had been demanded. Yet, the South African TRC regime also intensively
investigated confessing culprits who were suspected of not telling all. If it was
discovered they had held back, the perpetrators were relegated to ordinary
criminal prosecutions.8 4 Other countries--Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, over
twenty in all-have also adopted commission-style justice; even Bosnia and
Serbia now have fledgling (and somewhat controversial) truth commissions.
Sierra Leone's TRC, with no amnesty, has operated alongside its Special
Court documenting through 7,000 interviews in horrific detail the terrors of
the civil war."
While acknowledging growing sentiment that trials should be melded
with other mechanisms involving direct victim input, and that some intema-
tional entity (e.g., the UN or the ICC) should coordinate these facilities,
TRC advocates suggest that the Truth Commission format can more accu-
rately discern truth. Unlike the courtroom exercise, TRCs are free from rigid
relevance restraints on evidence and heightened stress on formal rules of
fairness to individual defendants. TRCs, they say, are victim oriented; trials
are defendant focused. Victims and witnesses can express their real feelings,
even abusers can own up to past misdeeds and solicit forgiveness. Restitu-
tion can take the form of working for communal good, a recommendation
espoused by one of the Hemingway partisans in For Whom the Bell Tolls.
6
So far, however, there is no consensus that TRCs alone can pacify the deep
grievances of victims of atrocities as brutal and extensive as occurred in the
Bosnian war. But they may provide a more intimate and flexible forum in
which victims can express their deepest feelings about those who have
87wronged them -something the novelists would surely approve of.
Not all alternatives to the criminal process turn out to be preferable,
however; many have their own shortcomings. An illustration is the operation
of gacacas in Rwanda, which originated in tribal and village gatherings to
arbitrate informally civil disputes and grievances. Originally, arbitrators
84. Cobban, supra note 12.
85. See William A. Schabas, Truth Commissions and Courts Working in Parallel: The Sierra
Leone Experience, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L PROC. 189, 189 (2004) ("[P]ost-conflict justice requires a
sometimes complex mix of synergistic therapies... "').
86. HEMINGWAY, supra note 57, at 196 ("I think that after the war there .... must be some
form of civic penance organized that all may be cleansed from the killing .... ).
87. Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B.L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional
Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work
Together, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 93, 103 (2007).
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were chosen by the parties. But in 1994, following the national genocide,
the Rwandan government formalized the gacacas by law, giving the new
gacaca courts essentially the same mandate as war crimes tribunals except
as to the most serious felonies. They were mandated to punish, reconcile,
eliminate the "culture of impunity," and establish a historical record of the
role and extent of the genocide. Gacaca judges are chosen by community
election, receive minimal training, and can impose prison sentences up to
thirty years. Hailed originally as a "transformative democratic" change
agent, concerns are now expressed that they devalue criminal defense rights.
Up to six thousand Rwandans were convicted in the first year of their opera-
tion, several thousand more than in the country's civilian courts; but it is
reported that many pled guilty or fled in fear of police reprisals or unfair
trials if brought before the gacacas. Unfortunately, a large number of inci-
dents of bribery have surfaced and the integrity of some of the judges has
been impugned. In some instances, the gacacas have refused to investigate
crimes committed by members of the victorious Tutsi party in their war
against the Hutus. Gacaca witnesses and court officials have too frequently
been subjected to violence and intimidation, and entire communities have
refused to participate in the gacacas for fear of retaliation. One surveyor
reported that "the country seems close to a dangerous abandonment by
would-be participants of the goals of the gacaca courts process. '88 Human
rights groups report political pressures not to criticize the gacacas.8
The irony in all this of course is that the destructive acts committed in
the workings of the gacacas are of the same genre as the war crimes that are
their subject, reminding one of Yossarian's cynical caution in Catch-22:
"The enemy ... is anybody who's going to get you killed, no matter which
side he's on .... And don't you forget that, because the longer you remem-
ber it, the longer you might live."9
The search continues for a way to close the impunity gap, to "achieve
reconciliation between perpetrators and victims who must live side by side
in a densely-populated territory" 9' against the backdrop of unspeakable hap-
penings in the past. The war crimes tribunals are a beginning and-I
personally think-a necessary step toward assuaging the demonic legacy of
war. The writings of war novelists are invaluable in not letting us forget that
the laws of war-even when enforced against individual perpetrators-are
at best palliatives to the disease of war itself.
CONCLUSION
The best war novels challenge the concept of war itself: its futility, bru-
tality, insanity, and arbitrariness; its victimization of the innocent. War
crimes tribunals try to expose and punish the most extreme forms of human
88. Le Mon, supra note 43, at 18.
89. Id. at 19; see also Hafner & King, supra note 87.
90. HELLER, supra note 4, at 122.
91. Le Mon, supra note 43.
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action in war by imposing an international code of humanitarian law. Many
novelists seek to evoke revulsion to war by reducing its immensity and harm
to the plight of individuals caught up in its throes. Similarly, the tribunals try
to explicate for the public the terrible consequences of war to victims from
the actions or inactions of political and military leaders who instigate and
orchestrate war. But the tribunals have been imperfect forums for their pur-
poses. Predictably they have not yet been able to approach full satisfaction
for war's impotent victims or to inspire sufficiently widespread efforts to
curb the terrifying revelations of the courtroom. It is probably unrealistic to
think they can ever do so alone. But like the novelists, they try their best to
reveal the dark underside of wars spawned by nationalistic, tyrannical lead-
ers and to bring at least some of those leaders to account.
